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**Command in Joint and Combined Operations: The
Campaign for the Netherlands East Indies**

**A Monograph
by
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Infantry**



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Among the conclusions drawn from this investigation are: combined commands must be supported by a cohesive alliance whose countries possess similar interests and a desire to prevail; combined commands should be organized prior to war; the multinational commander's personality must enable him to understand and operate in the politico-strategic realities of the coalition; and United States doctrine must more fully address the possibility of future combined commands in which the commander is not an American.


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
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
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ABSTRACT

COMMAND IN JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS: THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES, by Major John R. Kennedy, USA, 66 pages.

This monograph is a study of command at the theater level, using the campaign for the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) in early 1942 as a case study. This campaign is examined as a means to validate current United States doctrine for command in joint and combined operations, which can be distilled into two statements:

- 1) The commander should have the authority to direct actions necessary within his command to accomplish the mission.
- 2) The commander must ensure coordination among his subordinate commands to obtain unity of effort.

The analysis of the NEI campaign is divided into three time periods. Prior to Pearl Harbor, the Allies in the Pacific failed to form a combined command. The Directive that specified the formation of the American, British, Dutch, and Australian Command (ABDACOM) did not give the Supreme Commander adequate authority, but did provide him with the ability to obtain unity of effort. During ABDACOM's defense of the Malay Barrier from 15 January to 25 February 1942, GEN Sir Archibald Wavell as Supreme Commander failed to direct the actions necessary to accomplish the mission and did not obtain unity of effort.

Among the conclusions drawn from this investigation are: combined commands must be supported by a cohesive alliance whose countries possess similar interests and a desire to prevail; combined commands should be organized prior to war; the multinational commander's personality must enable him to understand and operate in the politico-strategic realities of the coalition; and United States doctrine must more fully address the possibility of future combined commands in which the commander is not an American.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated in his State of the Union address in January 1942 that wars were now joint endeavors and would be waged in coalition with other countries. The experience of the United States in this century has certainly corroborated his assertion. Joint operations have become one of the premiere issues within the military since the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Combined or coalition warfare has played a major role in American combat actions since the beginning of American entry into World War I, and since the end of World War II the United States has entered into numerous defensive alliances with other nations.¹

Command is an extremely important issue in joint and combined operations and must be successfully exercised in order to accomplish the assigned mission. Defined as "the authority that a commander in the military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment,"² command in joint and combined environments is decidedly different from command over elements of one service.

Currently, unified command headquarters struggle intensely with command relationships among their service contingents and within their Joint Task Forces.³ Contentious issues within these headquarters include the

application of the preponderance of force standard, service sensibilities, and seniority.⁴ These considerations must be addressed by the unified commander when structuring his command. Combined commands only exacerbate these concerns while adding new problems. The much greater friction inherent in a combined command structure multiplies the potential for a confusing and dysfunctional command arrangement. Issues such as divergent national aims, the personalities of the senior commanders, and the often overriding loyalty to one's national leaders make the combined command equation considerably more complex.

The United States faced these problems immediately after being thrust into World War II by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Within three weeks of American entry into the war, Army Chief of Staff GEN George C. Marshall insisted that the Allies form a "unified" command in the Pacific to ensure unity of command. He desired to set a precedent that would be continued in other theaters throughout the war. The American, British, Dutch, and Australian Command (ABDACOM) resulted, and the newly formed Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) tasked ABDACOM to hold the Malay Barrier. Each of the four ABDA countries provided naval, air, and ground assets to ABDACOM. By mid-January 1942 when the command became operational, the Japanese had already attacked Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies (NEI). Within two months, ABDACOM ceased to exist and all of the Malay peninsula and the NEI were part of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity

Sphere.

This paper will examine the inception of Allied efforts to establish a "unified" command in the Pacific to provide perspective on current American attempts to create effective joint and combined command structures. This study will also discuss the difficulties intrinsic to combined commands as a means to improve the ability of the United States armed forces to conduct joint and combined operations. The monograph will answer the question, Do the lessons regarding command in joint and combined operations based on a case study of the campaign for the NEI substantiate or refute the following salient principles from current United States doctrine?

- 1) The commander should have the authority to direct actions necessary within his command to accomplish the mission.

- 2) The commander must ensure coordination among his subordinate commands to obtain unity of effort.

Chapter 2

CURRENT DOCTRINE CONCERNING JOINT AND COMBINED COMMAND

The primary doctrinal publications that address joint and combined command are JCS Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations; JCS Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF); AFSC Pub 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide; and FM 100-5, Operations. The vast majority of extant doctrine deals with joint operations, and a new manual addressing combined operations (FM 100-8, Combined Army Operations) is currently being written. Only portions of both JCS Pub 3-0 and FM 100-5 deal with combined operations, and many of the principles that apply to joint command must be extrapolated to combined command also. JCS Pub 2 governs strictly "joint activities and performance"¹ of United States forces and does not specifically deal with combined operations.²

The salient principles from current United States doctrine concerning joint and combined command can be summarized in two statements. The first is that the commander should have the authority to direct actions necessary within his command to accomplish the mission. Examples of actions that a joint and combined commander should have the authority to direct include organizing and employing commands and forces; assigning tasks; designating objectives; providing direction over all aspects of military operations, joint and combined training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the assigned mission; assigning

subordinate commanders and primary staff officers; and specifying the chain of command.³

The second statement is that the commander must ensure coordination among his subordinate commands to obtain unity of effort. JCS Pub 2 states that unity of effort results in the effective use of the nation's military power through the close integration of the efforts of the separate military services. Unity of effort is the overarching tenet guiding the use of the armed forces of the United States. The Department of Defense should form a unified command whenever it would best serve the nation's security interests. A unified command should be established when a broad, continuing mission exists that requires significant forces from two or more services and that necessitates "single strategic direction."⁴

A commander can ensure coordination among his subordinate commands in many ways. He can provide centralized direction; allow decentralized execution; insist upon common doctrine; make interoperability a priority which should lead to greater commonality in tactics, techniques, and procedures; review the supporting plans of his component commanders to ensure they support the accomplishment of his mission; allow no person or personality to act in any manner contrary to the necessary cooperative effort; require the exchange of liaison officers with the requisite communications between forces; establish habitual relationships among forces of different countries that

operate together; demand detailed planning, rehearsals, and wargaming between allied units; require minimum essential information in tactical plans such as fire control measures; and cooperate early with allies to determine how each can best contribute to the accomplishment of the mission." (See Appendix 1. Principal Tenets for Joint and Combined Command.)


Chapter 3

ALLIED ATTEMPTS TO FORM A UNIFIED COMMAND IN THE PACIFIC PRIOR TO WAR

Japan had posed a threat to the interests of the United States, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Australia, and other nations in Asia long before 7 December 1941. After Versailles, Japanese and Australian possessions were only two hundred and eighty-five miles apart in the Western Pacific, and as early as 1921 the Australian Prime Minister considered Japan as the chief security concern for his nation. The march of Japanese conquest began in September 1931 in Manchuria, and throughout the ensuing ten years the Japanese menace to allied interests in the region increased dramatically (see Chronology at Appendix 2). Allied possessions in the Western Pacific included the Philippines for the United States; Singapore, Malaya, North Borneo, Hong Kong, Sarawak, and Burma for the United Kingdom; the NEI for the Netherlands; New Guinea for Australia; and Indochina for France.¹

As the decade of the 1930s progressed, the allied nations became more aware of the threat posed by Japan. The Allies undertook various efforts to form a consensus on the most effective defense arrangement to protect their interests. Initially the Western nations unilaterally attempted to improve their military capabilities in the area. Beginning with the Franco-British naval conference in

MAP 1



Singapore in June 1939. however. the Allies consulted frequently in an attempt to coordinate their respective defensive plans and military forces.²

The two most important conferences occurred during the first four months of 1941. British and American conferees met in Washington surreptitiously from 29 January to 29 March 1941. Known as the American-British Conversations (or ABC meetings), the agenda included national military positions, command arrangements, and possible combined military action by both countries in the Atlantic and Pacific. The British wanted the United States to build up its Asiatic Fleet and then commit it in operations with British and Dutch naval forces to counter Japanese aggression against Malaya. The United States planned to withdraw the Asiatic Fleet from the Philippines once the islands were invaded and use it to defend the Malay Barrier. The Americans also informed the British that no additional vessels would be sent to augment the Asiatic Fleet. The conversations (known as ABC-1) ended without any agreement concerning a combined command in the Pacific.³

The greatest consensus formed prior to war resulted from the 21-27 April 1941 conference in Singapore. All of the future ABDA nations attended in addition to representatives from New Zealand and India. The conferees intended to plan a concept of defense in the Far East based on the completed ABC-1 talks. The attendees agreed to combined commands for the naval and air forces, both under

British commanders. The British Commander-in-Chief (CINC), China Station, was to provide "unified strategical direction"⁴ over all Allied naval forces in the theater. The only forces exempted included those engaged in local defense and that portion of the Asiatic Fleet stationed in the Philippines. The conference devised a similar plan for the Allied air forces under Air Chief Marshall Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, who held the position of British CINC, Far East.⁵

The principal disagreement at the conference involved the importance of defending Singapore, which the British (but not the Americans) believed to be paramount. The United States rejected the plan recommended by the conference, known as ABD-1. Both ADM H.R. Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations⁶ and GEN Marshall disagreed with the plan's strategic concepts, political implications, and the possibility of Asiatic Fleet employment in a strategically unimportant area to the United States.⁷

The Americans, more than any other nationality, prevented the Allies from achieving unity of effort prior to the outbreak of war in the Pacific. The British had suffered defeat in Norway in the spring of 1940, and realized that the lack of a unified command among the British and their French and Norwegian allies had contributed to the German victory. The Dutch and British closely collaborated in the Pacific before hostilities began, and in April 1941 the Royal Netherlands Navy placed

five vessels under the operational command of the British CINC, China.⁹

The United States never committed to a combined command in the Pacific primarily because it never intended to employ sizable forces in the region outside of the Philippines. "The Americans felt that the Far East...was a British and Dutch sphere of responsibility" and that those nations should shoulder the burden of fighting in the area.⁷ The United States did not approve the ABD-2 talks resulting from the Churchill-Roosevelt meeting at Argentia in August 1941, and to the Allies, American policy in the Far East seemed "cautious, self-dependent and sometimes puzzling."¹⁰

As the war clouds grew darker over the Pacific in 1940 and 1941, both the British and the Americans created joint commands under CINCs (Brooke-Popham in Malaya and GEN MacArthur in the Philippines).¹¹ Concurrently, American joint doctrine concerning unified command unfortunately reverted back to "mutual cooperation" from its sixteen-year concept that the service with the "paramount interest" provided the joint force commander.¹² Since effective combined commands build on the principles of joint command, armed forces that experience problems agreeing on joint command issues typically encounter substantial difficulties operating in a combined environment.¹³

The Commander of the United States Asiatic Fleet, ADM Thomas C. Hart, stated that the Allied naval forces never formed a unified command before the war.¹⁴ He

believed that if war came, the country with the largest naval force in the region (either the United Kingdom or United States) would probably command the Allied naval forces. He knew that the British and Dutch had developed plans for combined naval operations, and assumed that if the American government released the Asiatic Fleet to fight with the other Allied naval forces, it would be integrated into existing Anglo-Dutch arrangements. ADM Hart summarized the American situation at the beginning of hostilities by stating, "We entered the War, therefore, in a slightly hazy situation as regards our relationships and comitments [sic] toward our Allies."¹⁵

Chapter 4

THE FORMATION OF ABDACOM

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 brought the United States into the war and caused the four ABDA nations in the Pacific to officially become Allies. By the end of 8 December, Japan had launched attacks on the Philippines, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaya, Midway, and Thailand. American and British possessions had been directly assaulted. The surprise attacks on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines removed any reluctance on the part of the United States to seriously consult with its allies. Consequently, Prime Minister Churchill and his Chiefs of Staff arrived in Washington on 22 December 1941 for talks with President Roosevelt and the top American military leaders.

On 23 December 1941 Roosevelt stated at a press conference that the United States and United Kingdom were "working out a complete unity of action in regard to the Southwest Pacific."¹ GEN Marshall on the following day asserted that the Allies needed one man to command all of the ground, air, and sea assets in the Far East theater. He believed that a unified command in the Southwest Pacific would solve nearly all of the problems associated with British-American operations in the region. Roosevelt broached the subject with Churchill on Christmas Day and, at first, the Prime Minister balked. He contended that the

proposed theater was so large that friendly forces would be one thousand miles apart, too great an expanse for any one commander to control.²

The British Chiefs of Staff convinced Churchill on 26 December to accept a "unified" command in the Southwest Pacific. Selecting a commander proved to be a more divisive process. Neither the Americans nor the British seized the opportunity to nominate one of their countrymen as the commander. The British Chiefs recommended that an American be named so that if (or when) the command failed to accomplish its mission the blame would not rest on a British officer. The Americans suggested that GEN Sir Archibald Wavell be given the command,³ although some of the American military leaders opined that a British commander might be preoccupied with protecting his nation's interests at the expense of Allied concerns. Churchill accepted the choice of Wavell as commander, and reprimanded his Chiefs of Staff for being suspicious of their American counterparts. Most of these leaders realized the chances for complete success were slim, but Marshall insisted on setting a precedent of unified command that he hoped would continue in other theaters throughout the war.⁴

In order to direct this new unified command in the Pacific and guide actions in other theaters of war, the British and American negotiators formed a Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS). Considered "one of the most significant developments of the war,"⁵ the British Chiefs of Staff

suggested the CCS concept as a counter to ADM Ernest J. King's recommendation that the ABDACOM Commander work for a body composed of American, British, Australian, and Dutch representatives.⁶ Designed primarily to provide military advice to Churchill and Roosevelt and to implement their decisions, the CCS was located in Washington and contained representatives from the British Chiefs of Staff which worked with the American Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁷

The CCS issued a directive to Wavell delineating his mission as ABDACOM Commander and the boundaries of his theater of war, yet the conferees struggled for several days to create this document. The principal problems encountered (which are endemic to coalition warfare) related to amalgamating the diverse interests of the participating nations and employing their forces in accordance with national desires. The British and American leaders developed the first "experiment in international command for World War II"⁸ within several parameters. The negotiators sought to establish a command structure that equitably shared the amount of control between the British and Americans, that accounted for the relative strengths of forces committed, and that excluded the participation of the Dutch and Australians to preserve speed of decision and security.⁹


The CCS issued the "'ABDACOM' Directive to Supreme Commander" on 3 January 1942, and Wavell received it the following day. The Directive named Wavell as the Supreme

Commander of all forces located within the ABDA area (see Map 2) or in Australia for support of ABDA operations. The CCS ordered Wavell to hold the Malay Barrier, maintain control of Australia and Burma as vital support locations, reopen communications to Luzon via the NEI to support the forces in the Philippines, and maintain the needed communications throughout the ABDA area. The Directive stipulated that Wavell's staff would consist of officers from every nation in ABDACOM, and that Wavell would report directly to the CCS. Wavell could not restrict communication between his national commanders and their governments, and if the national commander believed an order given by the Supreme Commander seriously jeopardized the interests of his country he had the right to appeal that order to his government.¹⁰

The CCS concurrently published the command and staff arrangements within ABDACOM (see Appendix 3). Both Prime Minister John Curtin of Australia and Wavell desired more Australian representation on the ABDACOM staff.¹¹ As a result, on 21 January 1942 MG C.E.M. Lloyd from the Australian Army assumed duties as Wavell's senior administrative officer.¹² Although the ABDACOM staff did include officers drawn from each of the Allied countries as directed by the CCS, ADM Hart believed that the British Army dominated the command and consequently focused ABDACOM's attention on Malaya (including Singapore) and later on Burma.¹³

MAP 2

This map obtained from Wigmore, p. 200.



Each of the ABDA nations had differing interests within the theater of war (ABDA area) and disparate ideas concerning the most important islands within the theater of operations (NEI) to defend. The United States desired to conduct an economy of force operation in the Southwest Pacific while defending the Philippines as long as possible. Within the NEI, the islands closest to Australia (such as Timor and Ambon) were the most important to the United States. The British considered Singapore the linchpin of its Pacific Empire and deemed Sumatra, due to its proximity to Singapore, as the key island in the NEI. The Dutch desired to conduct a forward defense of the NEI and augmented the British with air and naval assets to fight for Malaya and Singapore. Java, headquarters of the NEI government and armed forces, was the most important island to the Dutch. Australia committed a division to the defense of Malaya, but during the campaign for the NEI continually attempted to retrieve its forces deployed overseas for the defense of the homeland. Like the United States, Australia regarded those islands closest to its borders as the most vital. These differing national interests demonstrated that "[d]ivergent aims bedeviled the new ABDA...combined command...throughout the six stormy weeks of its existence."¹⁴

Once ABDACOM officially became operational, the forces of the four Allied nations in the ABDA theater of war (or in Australia designated to support operations in the

region) were to come under Wavell's command. In reality the command arrangements did not follow the CCS Directive. MacArthur continued to report directly to the War Department in Washington per Marshall's instructions. Other than the dispatch of some supplies to the Philippines, ABDACOM did not exercise control nor provide support to the American defense of the Philippines.¹⁵

Prior to his receipt of the official ABDACOM Directive, Wavell asked the British Chiefs of Staff for the Allied order of battle. The Chiefs of Staff could not inform Wavell of the Allied forces that would be a part of his command. Although the national forces placed under ABDACOM changed somewhat during the campaign, the British and Dutch committed substantial land, sea, and air forces to the command. The American contribution consisted primarily of the Asiatic Fleet with its forty-four major combatants, including twenty-nine submarines. The Australian contribution was primarily land forces with over thirty-four thousand soldiers located in Malaya, Timor, Ambon, Java, and northern Australia (see Appendix 4 for a more detailed listing of Allied forces in ABDACOM).¹⁶

The Japanese, meanwhile, had made substantial gains since 7 December 1941. Within five weeks the Americans had retreated to the Bataan Peninsula and the British had been forced back to the southern portion of Malaya. Japan committed only ten of its fifty-one divisions and four of its fifty-nine brigades (a force of approximately 250,000

combat and 150,000 support troops) to the attack south. The Japanese 16th Army, containing three divisions and an infantry group, conducted the attack on the NEI. The Imperial Japanese Navy assigned the 1st Air Fleet commanded by VADM C. Nagumo of Pearl Harbor fame to defeat the NEI. Overall, the Japanese forces compared favorably to the forces available to ABDACOM.

On land, the Allies mustered approximately 359,000 soldiers throughout the theater of war compared to the 400,000 Japanese ground troops. Rough equality in numbers did not guarantee parity in capabilities, since the majority of the American forces in the Philippines, the British in Malaya, and the Dutch in the NEI consisted of native soldiers. The Japanese consistently achieved superior combat power at the point of attack, and they proved much more capable in amphibious, jungle, and night operations.¹⁷

In the air, Japan deployed 700 Army and 840 Navy aircraft in the attack south. Allied totals range from 700 to 1000 planes, including all operational aircraft in the Royal Australian Air Force. All the ABDA nations and Wavell himself realized that airpower would be the decisive arm in the theater of war. However, during the campaign, Allied dispositions and operations demonstrated a failure to mass airpower, and Allied air operations proved to be ultimately ineffective.¹⁸

At sea, the number of combatants on each side appeared generally equal at the outbreak of the war in the

Pacific (see Chronology at Appendix 2 for December 1941). After Pearl Harbor, however, the United States rejected the use of the Pacific Fleet in the ABDA area and redefined its primary mission as the defense of Alaska, Hawaii, and Samoa. The Japanese possessed a large advantage in aircraft carriers. The other Japanese vessels were generally newer, faster, and better armed. R. Ernest and Trevor N. Dupuy characterized ABDAFLOAT as a collection of a few old British, American, and Dutch ships. The Japanese fleet proved better trained than its adversary (especially in night operations) and had shorter lines of communication. In summary, the Japanese armed forces enjoyed advantages in training, equipment, intelligence, interoperability, and in unity of command.¹⁷

On 5 January 1942, the day after he received the CCS Directive appointing him Supreme Commander of ABDACOM, Wavell left Delhi and arrived in Singapore two days later to confer with LTG A.E. Percival. Wavell flew from Singapore and landed in Batavia on the island of Java on 10 January and immediately met his staff. By this time the Japanese had secured footholds in Dutch Borneo and in Celebes (see Map 3). Wavell established ABDACOM Headquarters in a hotel in Lembang, close to Bandung and the NEI Army Headquarters.

The designation of a unified command did not erase resistance to a combined organization. The principal naval commanders, ADM Hart, ADM Sir Geoffrey Layton (British Navy), and VADM Conrad E.H. Helfrich (CINC, Royal NEI Navy)



met to coordinate the operations and command relationships within ABDAFLOAT on 9 January.²⁰ Layton desired to maintain the current affiliation with the Royal Navy, wherein the British would continue to escort convoys into Singapore outside of the ABDAFLOAT command. Hart disapproved for "such a method would mean responsibility without commensurate authority."²¹ Layton eventually concurred.²²

Although President Roosevelt asserted in his State of the Union Address on 6 January 1942 that the United Nations had achieved "unified command of land, sea, and air forces in the southwestern Pacific theater of war,"²³ the CCS Directive did not give Wavell the authority to direct actions necessary to accomplish his mission. The CCS prohibited him from organizing and employing his commands and forces because he could not move his forces from one territory to another within his theater. The right to appeal orders issued by the Supreme Commander prevented Wavell from being able to freely assign tasks and objectives. The Supreme Commander could not relieve national force commanders, which curtailed his ability to assign subordinates. Finally, the ABDA governments selected the Deputy Commander and component commanders which prevented Wavell from being able to completely specify the chain of command.²⁴

The Directive did provide Wavell the authority to ensure coordination among his subordinate commands to obtain unity of effort (see Paragraph 2 of Appendix 1). It enabled

him to provide centralized direction by ordering the Supreme Commander to coordinate the strategic operations of all ABDA forces. Decentralized execution could be achieved through the various component commanders. The CCS authorized Wavell to review the supporting plans of his subordinates by allowing him to require reports from his commanders. Wavell could coordinate with the respective armed forces to obtain staff officers for his command, which enabled him to determine how each Ally could best contribute to the accomplishment of the mission. In summary, Wavell entered the fight on 15 January without the authority to direct actions necessary to accomplish the mission, yet he did possess the ability to obtain unity of effort.

Marshall understood fully the limitations imposed on the Supreme Commander of ABDACOM by the CCS Directive, but agreed to these provisions for two reasons. He hoped to persuade the British to concur with a unified command in the Southwest Pacific by limiting the power of the commander. Furthermore, he sincerely believed that a combined command with a somewhat restricted commander was vastly superior to a theater without any unified command structure. At noon on 15 January 1942 Wavell declared ABDACOM operational.²⁵


Chapter 5

THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES

By mid-January 1942, the Japanese had achieved substantial military success in the Philippines and Malaya; had secured Hong Kong, Thailand, Guam, North Borneo, and Wake; and had established a foothold within the NEI. To counter the Japanese thrusts, Wavell intended to maintain a line of airbases linking Darwin, Timor, Java, southern Sumatra, and Singapore. The Allies faced a formidable challenge in defending the NEI due to the large number of islands and the dearth of roads. Despite the odds, several of the Allied commanders remained optimistic. Wavell predicted that Burma and Singapore could be held and VADM Helfrich believed that ABDAFLOAT's cruisers and destroyers could severely damage Japanese amphibious flotillas.¹

As the Supreme Commander, Wavell soon became the target of intense examination by an ABDA head of state. Within his first week in command, Wavell considered forming an area command (equivalent to today's theater of operations) including northern Australia, Ambon, and Timor under an Australian commander. He informed Prime Minister Curtin of the plan in response to Curtin's complaints over lack of Australian participation in ABDACOM's command and staff arrangements. Wavell never formed the area command, yet this episode illustrates the scrutiny often placed on combined commanders by heads of state within an alliance.

MAP 4



Further disagreements arose among the allies concerning reinforcement strategy. On 23 January 1942 Curtin learned that the British were considering diverting reinforcements bound for Singapore to Burma due to the worsening situation in Malaya. Curtin believed that the British were contemplating building up forces in Burma at the expense of Australia. He informed Churchill that if the British sent reinforcements to Burma instead of the NEI, such action would be "deeply resented."²

On 30 January, the Japanese landed on Ambon and in five days secured the island. The task force of air, sea, and ground forces assembled to capture Ambon was larger than any comparable force mustered by the United States in the Pacific until late 1943. During this operation, the Japanese diverted from their modus operandi by attacking without the support of land based aircraft. ABDACOM lost some of its best Dutch troops, an Australian battalion, some outdated Dutch planes, and the important Amboina Naval Base.³

On the day after the fall of Ambon, Japanese aircraft attacked an American and Dutch flotilla of four cruisers and eight destroyers in the Madoera Strait. RADM Karel Willem Frederik Marie Doorman commanded the Allied naval forces, which attempted to attack the Japanese fleet in Macassar Strait.⁴ The Japanese enjoyed complete air superiority and damaged several Allied vessels, including the American cruiser Marblehead which sailed out of the area

and arrived at Brooklyn on 4 May 1942. Doorman called off the attack before reaching the Japanese naval forces and returned to Tjilatjap on the southern coast of Java. ADM Hart considered relieving Doorman for not pressing home the attack, but in the interest of combined command and control within ABDACOM decided to retain him in command.³

Between 13 and 15 February Doorman again sallied forth to prevent an amphibious landing at Palembang on the island of Sumatra. The Allied squadron contained five cruisers and ten destroyers from all four ABDA nations. On 15 February Japanese reconnaissance aircraft discovered his approach and for eight hours the Allied fleet suffered unhampered aerial bombardment. Doorman reversed course after receiving damage to two ships, but before making contact with the Japanese invasion fleet. Doorman had proved to be overly cautious, yet he was Dutch and therefore more difficult for an American commander to replace. Had he been an American (with Hart as the ABDAFLOAT Commander), in all likelihood he would have been relieved.⁴

By mid-February, after one month of existence, ABDACOM began unravelling at the seams. The command had suffered a series of defeats including the loss of Kendari in the Celebes, Balikpapan in Borneo, Palembang in Sumatra, Ambon, Malaya, and portions of Burma. The crushing blow fell on 15 February when the ten week campaign for Malaya ended with the surrender of Singapore. During this campaign, the British suffered 138,708 casualties to 9824 of

the Japanese. At this critical time Dutch discontent with ABDACOM erupted. The Netherlands Government-in-Exile had never been consulted in the formation of ABDACOM and believed that the ABDAFLOAT Commander should have been VADM Helfrich. The Dutch complained often about the lack of direction they exercised over the war effort in ABDACOM. On 12 February they convinced President Roosevelt to replace ADM Hart, and two days later Hart relinquished command to VADM Helfrich.⁷

Another evidence of the dissolution pervading ABDACOM concerned the nature and frequency of Wavell's visits away from the Headquarters. Within the five week period between 7 January and 10 February 1942, Wavell travelled five times to Singapore and once to Rangoon. Some of Wavell's detractors, notably ADM Hart, observed that Wavell's numerous visits detracted from the prosecution of the ABDACOM mission. Hart wrote, "His [Wavell's] absence on journeys of that sort [Singapore and Rangoon] seemed to create the impression that he was not taking enough interest in the affairs of the N.E.I."⁸ (Coalition commanders must be aware that their actions are much more open to misinterpretation by those of other nationalities. A perception of favoritism to one's own forces will certainly lead to discontent within the command.)

Between 15 and 20 February 1942 defeat after defeat buffeted ABDACOM. Wavell ordered the Allied attempt to reinforce Timor (with an American field artillery and an

Australian infantry battalion) to return to Darwin in the face of an expected Japanese invasion of the island. Doorman's attempt to disrupt the Japanese landings on Bali failed and the island's defenders capitulated on 19 February. On that same day, a powerful Japanese air raid on the Australian port of Darwin destroyed the naval base. RADM W.A. Glassford began moving the remnants of what had once been the Asiatic Fleet from Tjilatjap to Exmouth Gulf, Australia.⁷

On 20 February the Japanese landed on Timor, and Wavell concluded that a successful defense of Java had become impossible. He requested permission to withdraw British troops from the ABDA area. The Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) notified Wavell, "There should be no withdrawal of troops or air forces of any nationality, and no surrender."⁸ Land forces enroute to the NEI from the west would be sent elsewhere, and the CCS instructed him to defend Java with the forces on hand. On the next day the CCS informed Wavell that he could move his headquarters anywhere within or outside of the ABDA area. He responded that ABDACOM should be disbanded, since the Dutch could best command the forces (which were primarily Dutch) remaining on Java.¹¹

Wavell cabled his situation and intentions to the CCS on 21 February. His air forces now numbered less than forty fighters and forty bombers. He possessed little ability to prevent an invasion of Java. He proposed to

leave approximately four thousand British airmen, fifty-five hundred British soldiers, three thousand Australians, seven hundred Americans, and six hundred and fifty ABDACOM Headquarters personnel in Java for its defense. In his 22 February message to Churchill, Wavell stated, "I have failed you and [the] President here, where a better man might perhaps have succeeded."¹² Permitted to disband the command, Wavell dissolved ABDACOM on 25 February leaving the Dutch national commanders in charge of "the motley and insubstantial forces" still in Java.¹³

The climactic battle of the campaign occurred on 27 February in the Java Sea. Doorman and his squadron of five cruisers and ten destroyers sought to intercept a Japanese invasion convoy bound for Java. Once again the Allied flotilla had no air cover or reconnaissance, and suffered terribly from the air. The Allies lost seven ships including the fleet's flagship, the De Ruyter, which went down with Doorman aboard. The Japanese now enjoyed complete mastery of the air and sea, and the fate of Java had been sealed.¹⁴

On 28 February the Japanese landed forces at three locations on Java and the remnants of ABDAFLOAT attempted to escape to Australia. Of the surface combatants, only four American destroyers survived. The Japanese captured Bandung and Batavia on 5 March. On 9 March LTG ter Poorten surrendered Java unconditionally, thereby ending the campaign for the NEI.¹⁵

The factors contributing to the defeat of the Allied forces in the campaign for the NEI are numerous, and many resulted from combined command deficiencies. The principal cause for the defeat of the Allies was that they were completely unprepared to defend against the Japanese attacks launched on 7 and 8 December 1941. ABDACOM was not activated until almost six weeks after the initial Japanese onslaught. Forming the first combined command in the Pacific while defending against the rapid Japanese advance proved to be an unrealistic task. "Thus, when the war broke out in Asia, the Allies hurriedly had to improvise a combined military effort."¹⁴ Forging an effective combined military force under fire meant that ABDACOM had no time to conduct combined exercises, conduct other forms of combined training, or become acquainted with counterparts in other national forces. ABDACOM found itself in a crisis situation from its inception and never overcame its initial disadvantages due to the swift Japanese advance. The Allies squandered their time to coordinate military plans and command structures during peace, and then failed to commit sufficient forces to ABDACOM during the war.¹⁷

Based on the conclusion that the CCS Directive did not provide Wavell the requisite authority to direct actions necessary to accomplish his mission, the question remains whether or not he effectively used the authority he did possess. Using the criteria developed in Chapter 2 (and listed in Appendix 5), it is apparent that Wavell did not

use the authority given him to direct actions necessary to accomplish the mission. Although the outcome of the campaign would have probably been the same had the Supreme Commander directed a flawless defense, command errors certainly contributed to the overwhelming Japanese victory.

The CCS restricted Wavell's ability to organize and employ his commands and forces, yet he made two major mistakes during the campaign. Wavell continually violated the principle of mass, which allowed the Japanese to commit superior combat power at the point of decision and defeat the Allies. Ten days before Wavell dissolved ABDACOM, the Chief of the Australian General Staff, LTG Sir Vernon Sturdee wrote,

So far in this war against Japan we have violated the principle of concentration of forces in our efforts to hold numerous small localities with totally inadequate forces which are progressively overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers.¹⁶

In all three mediums the Allies proved unable to mass and to deliver decisive blows. Wavell's second error in employing his forces was lethargic execution. Both in his plan to form a theater of operations within ABDACOM and in his attempt to reinforce Timor, Wavell tarried and the Japanese thwarted his efforts by superior speed and agility.¹⁷

The ABDACOM Directive denied Wavell the ability to assign his subordinate commanders, yet he could recommend personnel changes to the CCS. Wavell added MG Lloyd to his staff which helped appease the Australian Prime Minister, but took no apparent action to replace RADM Doorman who

disabled only one enemy ship in three battles with Japanese naval and air forces. Conversely, a personality conflict surely existed between Wavell and ADM Hart, and Wavell allowed Hart to be replaced. Hart described Wavell as "an experienced commander of the rugged, hard-fighting, persistent type, and as a man he is an extremely likeable individual."²² As Wavell's most vocal detractor, however, Hart believed that Wavell had been less than honest with him.

Wavell's greatest shortcomings as a combined commander related to his inability to coordinate subordinate commands to obtain unity of effort. He can be faulted primarily in two areas, his lack of effective centralized direction and his toleration of actions contrary to the cooperative endeavor. Many of the other means a combined commander should possess to ensure unity of effort were unavailable due to the lack of time. To his credit, Wavell did ensure that his component command staffs contained a mix of nationalities and he maintained the habitual relationship of the British and Australian forces whenever possible. Wavell's directive from the CCS gave him the authority to ensure the necessary coordination among his subordinate ground, sea, and air forces, but he failed in this endeavor.

As the Supreme Commander of ABDACOM, Wavell never succeeded in making his command truly unified. ADM Hart wrote that "situations and operations were handled fully as

much under the cooperative principle as under the unity of command principle."²¹ The Strategic Bombing Survey concluded,

Faced by a rapidly advancing enemy and hindered by almost unsurmountable language difficulties and differences in national attitudes, the command was never more than a paper organization and actually never functioned as a unified command.²²

One of the reasons for the lack of a unified command was that component commanders continued to exercise direct control over their national forces. The ABDAFLOAT Chief of Staff, RADM Sir Arthur Palliser,²³ directly controlled the British naval assets while Hart "quite directly" managed the American fleet.²⁴ Because of the lack of a functional unified command, "the Allies did not work to the best advantage over the Area."²⁵

By sanctioning cooperation instead of ordering unity of effort, Wavell never fulfilled the role of a truly unified commander. He failed to mold the air, sea, and ground forces into an entity. The only orders ADM Hart ever received from Wavell during his entire tenure as ABDAFLOAT Commander involved maintaining escorts for the Singapore convoys. Perhaps the greatest disadvantage of this system of command involved the gross lack of air-sea coordination within ABDACOM. Wavell evidently understood the importance of air support for naval operations, yet never ordered the ABDAIR Commander to provide the needed support. Wavell expected informal cooperation between the ABDAFLOAT and ABDAIR Commanders to resolve this issue. In fact, ABDAFLOAT

never received any land based air support although at the daily command and staff meetings Hart incessantly pleaded for this support. Wavell never ordered a joint air-sea operation, and the outcome for ABDAFLOAT proved disastrous.²⁴

A second way in which Wavell failed to effectively coordinate his subordinate commands to obtain unity of effort was his perceived preference for British interests. On his many visits away from Java Wavell invariably called on British Army commanders. Additionally, he first sought to receive permission to remove British forces from the ABDACOM area once he realized that the campaign for the NEI had been lost. (A serving Bundeswehr officer assigned to Central Army Group Headquarters recently remarked that a multinational commander who demonstrates favoritism toward his own nationality is not capable of combined command.) Wavell's actions laid him open to this charge, and certainly inhibited the required cooperation needed to obtain unity of effort within ABDACOM.²⁷

Chapter 6

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The campaign for the NEI generally substantiates current United States doctrine for command in joint and combined operations. The two principal tenets concerning joint and combined command are valid and must be met to ensure operational success. The first half of this chapter will amplify the principles inherent in the two cardinal tenets for command in joint and combined operations. The paper will conclude with implications for the armed forces of the United States based on difficulties intrinsic to combined operations.

The combined commander must have the authority to direct actions necessary within his command to accomplish the mission in order to be successful. Fundamentally, he has "the responsibility...to achieve the strategic objective of the alliance or coalition."¹ He should, therefore, be given the authority to organize and employ his national forces with the least amount of restrictions possible. The commander should generally maintain national forces intact under their national commanders. To best organize his command, the combined commander should co-locate his subordinate headquarters like the Allies did in Java.

Ideally, the combined commander should possess the authority to assign and dismiss his subordinate commanders and primary staff. GEN Eisenhower believed that the

commander of a multinational force must continually replace officers who failed to exhibit the necessary cooperative attitude and reassign other officers until the combined commanders and staffs functioned smoothly as allies. He sought groups of officers willing and able to work together to accomplish a common purpose. Traditionally, within the American armed forces, the relief of an officer from one branch of service by a more senior officer of another service has caused immense animosity (as in the relief of the Commander of the 27th Infantry Division by LTG Holland M. Smith, USMC, in 1944). Although a sensitive issue, especially in the combined environment, the combined commander must be authorized the prerogatives of relief and assignment.

The second principal tenet from current doctrine concerning combined command is likewise necessary for success in interallied operations. The commander must ensure coordination among his subordinate commands to obtain unity of effort. The combined commander must provide the necessary centralized direction, in short he must command. Unfortunately for the Allies in the Southwest Pacific in 1942 and in Sicily in 1943, both combined commanders failed

to grasp the reins of higher command, to make the distinction between interference in the actions of his subordinate Army commanders and the necessity to impose his will at the right time and place; to use the power of his personality and position to influence the action while still permitting them the necessary initiative and latitude to carry out their respective missions.²

To obtain unity of command (a subset of unity of effort) one man is required to provide the critical centralized direction: a committee cannot accomplish the task.

AFM 1-1 states that unity of effort is obtained by unity of command plus a common doctrine.³ A multinational military force with an agreed upon, approved doctrine has already overcome many of the difficulties inherent in combined operations. As JCS Pub 3-0 states, the possession of a common doctrine can strengthen the alliance and when tested in combined exercises can greatly enhance the military potential of the force. Implicit in current doctrine, but not emphasized, is the fact that to be effective common doctrine must be established and validated in peacetime. As the campaign for the NEI demonstrated, the generation of a workable, common doctrine when engaged in combined warfare is virtually impossible.⁴

The combined commander must demand detailed planning, rehearsals, and wargaming because multinational commands are inherently less flexible than national forces operating independently. Intensive war planning with numerous branches and sequels is necessary for success in a combined environment. Current doctrine does not adequately address this point, and declares that the success of a combined command depends on its ability to respond to rapidly changing situations. Since national force commanders in a coalition will have a combined commander, yet will also be responsible to their own country's

leadership, multinational commands will be less able to respond quickly to unforeseen circumstances. The value, therefore, of detailed prior planning in combined commands cannot be overemphasized.⁵

Simplicity must become a dominant principle of war in combined operations. Not only must the commander demand that tactical plans contain specified, minimum essential information, but he should adopt uncomplicated concepts of operation that can be easily understood by his entire force. Likewise, the combined commander must intensely focus on his objective, which should be easy to comprehend and continually explained to his subordinates. Simplicity must pervade all aspects of combined operations in order for the combined commander to be successful.⁶

Combined command presents many intrinsic difficulties that must be understood and overcome. Probably the greatest guarantor of victory in combined operations is a cohesive alliance supporting the combined commander whose countries possess similar interests and a desire to prevail. The best combined commander, working for a fragmented alliance producing conflicting guidance and orders, is operating under an extreme handicap. Current doctrine brushes over this point and skips to the importance of a consensus within the alliance concerning the nature of the threat. I submit that this consensus will be ineffective unless supported by agreement on how to counter or defeat the threat. Carlo d'Este stated that differing operational

styles can affect combined commanders as severely as divergent national aims, and unless the coalition agrees on the concept for waging the war its effectiveness will be greatly diminished. These ideas address the political foundation of the combined command, yet are critical to the military success of the combined force.⁷

The second most important ingredient for successful combined operations is establishing the combined command before war begins. When formed prior to hostilities, coalitions have time to agree on a common purpose and combined commands have time to concur on common doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. JCS Pub 3-0 states "if actions are anticipated, multi-national arrangements should be made before, not after, actions are underway."⁸ This comment in no way conveys the criticality of laying the political and military foundation of the alliance before war erupts. As the campaign for the NEI demonstrates, forming an effective combined command in the heat of battle is almost impossible.

As an important part of membership in a military alliance, member nations must commit forward deployed forces (or units in the theater of war or operations), reinforcing forces, resources necessary for sustainment, and commanders able to command combined forces. The CINC must know what types of forces, logistical support, and which senior officers are available before he can develop the all-important war plan. The coalition must ensure each nation

honors its commitments. Furthermore, the CINC and each country should avoid placing one senior officer in two or more positions. Some allowance must be made for communication between a national commander and his government. This issue borders on national sovereignty, and procedures for this communication should be agreed upon as early as possible.

The combined commander should report to one superior, not several different heads of state. Normally this entity will be a body of senior alliance leaders or a combined high level staff (such as the CCS). Our doctrine contends that an American CINC reports both to the National Command Authority (NCA) and to the alliance leadership. The potential problem with this arrangement is the tendency for senior officers of other alliance nations to perceive favoritism by the Supreme Commander to his native country. As stated previously, the combined commander must consciously and continually assure the allies of his unbiased view of the alliance and its objectives.⁷

Much of the extant literature concerning command in combined operations deals with personalities, especially that of the commander. d'Este said personalities are at the essence of combined command. An Army War College study listed nine factors that have historically been present in successful combined commanders. Personality traits such as good interpersonal skills, the ability to persuade, tact, and sensitivity to national points of view were all listed.

Political astuteness seems universally accepted as a prerequisite for a successful combined commander. d'Este remarked that politics continually impacts upon the combined commander and his operations. The ability to understand the unique political climate of each country and the politico-strategic realities of the coalition are a must for the multinational commander. MacArthur's personality, for instance, prevented a truly unified command in the Pacific during and after ABDACOM.¹⁰

A future challenge for the United States armed forces will be developing doctrine for combined commands when the CINC is not an American. Most of our current doctrine assumes an American CINC and tasks him to ascertain how each country within the alliance can best contribute to the coalition's objectives. When faced with combined warfare, I believe there are four available command options. Perhaps the most difficult situation is when several countries contribute roughly equal forces and resources to the alliance military effort (like ABDACOM). A second option, when the national forces are roughly equivalent, is to segregate these different forces into totally separate theaters or areas of responsibility. When one nation provides the preponderance of forces then smaller national contingents can logically be placed under a commander of the larger force. Finally, the coalition can opt not to form a unified or combined command and rely on cooperation between different services or national forces. The Japanese in

ve southward in late 1941 and early 1942 used this cooperation between their Army and Navy to great These situations are all possible, and the United y be a junior partner in future combined commands. The campaign for the NEI demonstrated that a common (even most of the Dutchmen spoke English) does not common doctrine or operational style, and that the of a unified (or combined) command does not equate tied strategy. Convergent national aims are a must operational, combined commander to be successful in strategic goals by the use of tactical battles. t World War II, Eisenhower sought unity of effort e allied nations and unity of command within their ces.¹¹ Although every theater is unique, lessons from one combined campaign can be transferred, using ment, to another theater and time. The campaign NEI generally substantiated current American for command in joint and combined operations. If itions of JCS Pub 3-0, FM 100-5, and the yet to be FM 100-8 incorporate the conclusions drawn in this en our doctrine for command in joint and combined is will be improved and more responsive to future

ENDNOTES

Chapter 1

1. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1943), XI, p. 34.

Since 1945, the United States has entered into the following alliances:

- a. Rio Treaty (1945)
- b. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1949)
- c. Japan (1951)
- d. Philippines (1951)
- e. ANZUS (1951)
- f. Republic of Korea (1954)
- g. Republic of China (1954-1979)

h. Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (1954-1975). See John Spanier, Games Nations Play (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1984), pp. 102-103.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), JCS Pub 2 (Washington, 1986), p. 3-1, including Change 1 dated 21 April 1989.

3. This statement is based on talks by several members of unified command headquarters at the School of Military Studies in January 1990.

4. According to The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, JCS Pub 3-0, Final Draft (Washington, 1989), p. vii, the joint force component (land, naval, special operations) commander "will normally be the commander with the preponderance" of that type force.

Service sensibilities typically involve the Marine Corps, which often believes it should provide the air or land component commander when the JTF Commander has decided otherwise.

Chapter 2

1. JCS Pub 2, p. i.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, JCS Test Pub 3-0 (Washington, 1990), p. IV-1.

3. These actions have been extracted from JCS Pub 2, pp. 3-10, 3-12, and 3-16.

4. JCS Pub 2, pp. 1-1, 1-4, and 3-21.

5. These methods of ensuring coordination have been extracted from JCS Pub 2, pp. 3-2 and 3-26 and U.S. Department of the Army, Operations, FM 100-5 (Washington, 1986), pp. 166-168.

Chapter 3

1. Lionel Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust (Sydney: Halstead Press, 1957), p. 1.

2. Officially the Netherlands espoused neutrality in its foreign affairs, yet after the fall of the Netherlands in May 1940 the NEI was left "weak and almost unprotected" (Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan (New York: The Free Press, 1985), p. 62.) Even before the fall of the home country, the NEI realized it could not defend the islands without Allied assistance. The Dutch sought to be strong enough in the Far East so that the Americans and British would desire them as allies, yet also strong enough to avoid being overly dependent on uncertain American and British support. See MAJ Truman Smith, "The Defense of the Netherlands East Indies," Military Intelligence Division Report No. 14,499, 29 January 1936, Record Group 165, National Archives.

3. Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943 (Washington: Department of the Army, 1955), pp. 53-54 and Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1941-1942 (Washington: Department of the Army, 1953), pp. 32-34.

4. Wigmore, pp. 80-81.

5. Brooke-Popham became the first British CINC, Far East on 12 October 1940. His command was the first British attempt to create a joint, high level command in the region. He reported to the British Chiefs of Staff "for the higher direction and control, and general direction of training" for all British ground and air forces in Malaya, Sarawak, North Borneo, Burma, and Hong Kong (see Wigmore, pp. 46-47). His subordinate commanders included the General Officers Commanding in Malaya, Burma, and Hong Kong, and the Air Officer Commanding in the Far East. The command arrangements produced two problems. First, the command did not include the Royal Navy, and the Chiefs of Staff instructed Brooke-Popham to cooperate with the two naval commanders in the region (CINCs China and Far East). Second, the arrangements provided no interface with civil officials. Throughout his tenure as CINC, Far East, Brooke-Popham faced service rivalries and a lack of coordination between his subordinate elements.

Brooke-Popham had been a leader within the Royal Air Force (RAF) in World War I, and had commanded the Imperial Defense College between the wars. In 1936 he retired as the Inspector General of the RAF. When he assumed the post of CINC, Far East, Brooke-Popham was sixty-two years old. He visited GEN Douglas MacArthur and the other American commanders in Manila in April and October 1941, though little resulted from these meetings. One year prior to the

disastrous British defeat in Malaya and Singapore. he asserted that the Japanese aircraft were inferior to the British and that the British air forces could prevent Japan from defeating British forces in Malaya. GEN Sir Henry R. Pownall succeeded him as CINC, Far East, on 27 December 1941. See ADM Thomas C. Hart, Narrative of Events, Asiatic Fleet: Leading up to War and From 8 December 1941 to 15 February 1942 (Washington, 1942), p. 3; F.C. Van Oosten, The Battle of the Java Sea (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1976), p. 10; and Wigmore, pp. 46-48 and 58.

6. On 27 May 1940 ADM Stark ordered ADM J.O. Richardson to keep his Pacific Fleet in Hawaii indefinitely "because of the deterrent effect which it is thought your presence may have on the Japs going into the East Indies." See Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Pearl Harbor Attack (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1946), Part 14, p. 943.

7. Samuel Eliot Morison, The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War (New York: Ballantine Books, 1963), p. 73 and Wigmore, pp. 80-81.

8. J.R.M. Butler, Grand Strategy (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957), II, p. 553 and Van Oosten, p. 12.

9. Leighton and Coakley, p. 54.

10. Paul Hasluck, The Government and the People (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1952), p. 226; Matloff and Snell, p. 78; and Van Oosten, p. 11.

11. MacArthur had served as the Military Advisor to the Philippine Commonwealth before ordered to active duty by Roosevelt on 26 July 1941 and appointed as the Commander, United States Army Forces Far East. See Wigmore, pp. 87-88 and 90.

12. MAJ Raymond R. Drummond, "The Unified Command System and Unity of Command," (SAMS Monograph, 1986), p. 29.

13. The complexity of command increases as operations progress from those involving a single branch within a service, to combined arms operations, to joint operations, and finally to combined operations.

14. In 1941, the "irascible" ADM Hart had served forty-four years in the Navy and had been kept on active duty beyond his desired retirement in June (see Morison, p. 67). He played a major role in ABDACOM, and was the senior American in the command. See Hart, Supplementary of Narrative.

14. Hart, pp. 1, 11, and Supplementary of Narrative and Hasluck, p. 552.

Chapter 4

1. Roosevelt, X, p. 586.

2. John Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936-1945 (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 320 and Matloff and Snell, p. 123. At the ARCADIA Conference, the British and Americans agreed to the definitions of "joint" and "combined" as we know them today. Until that time, "joint" could refer to either interservice or interallied operations, and at that time "unified" generally referred to "combined" or "coalition" commands or organizations (see Matloff and Snell, p. 99).

3. Later to be promoted to Field Marshall, Wavell served as the General Officer Commanding (GOC) in the Middle East from 1939-1941 and in India from 1941-1943. When Churchill informed Wavell of his appointment as Commander, ABDACOM, he said "You are the only man who has the experience of handling so many different theaters at once" (see Wigmore, p. 201). Ever the optimist, Wavell predicted that Burma and Singapore could be held. He further stated that the Japanese fighting ability had been overrated.

There was no love lost between Wavell and ADM Hart, his ABDAFLOAT Commander. Hart faulted Wavell for surrounding himself with fellow British Army officers; for being primarily concerned with Malaya, Singapore, and Burma to the detriment of other areas within the ABDACOM theater of war; for his frequent trips to these locations which kept him away from the command's headquarters; for his lack of control over the ABDAIR Commander; and for his failure to ensure unity of command. See Spector, p. 129; B.H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1970), p. 235; Hart, pp. 61-62, 73, and Supplementary of Narrative; Hasluck, p. 300; and Wigmore, pp. 202 and 205.

4. Toland, pp. 320-321 and Spector, pp. 127-128. Suspicion, parochialism, and mistrust characterized both the American and British conferees at ARCADIA, and the British Chiefs of Staff left Washington on 14 January 1942 upset over the concessions made to the Americans (see Toland, p. 322).

5. Toland, p. 321.

6. ADM King was promoted from Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to Chief of Naval Operations on 31 December 1941.

Initially the ARCADIA attendees planned to exclude Australia from the command structure. Australian Prime Minister John Curtin cabled Churchill and Roosevelt in Washington and expressed his desire to have Australian representation on a council under the British and American heads of state which would supervise Wavell. The negotiators opted for the CCS which did not include

Australian representatives, but did add Australia as the fourth allied nation within ABDACOM. See Wigmore, p. 184.

7. BG Vincent J. Esposito, The West Point Atlas of American Wars (New York: Fred A. Praeger, 1959), II, p. 118 and Matloff and Snell, p. 125.

8. Matloff and Snell, p. 164.

9. Wigmore, p. 201 and Butler, II, p. 559. The Dutch and Australians accepted the ABDACOM Directive even though they had not been consulted during its formation. Both countries expressed disagreement with certain provisions of the Directive as the fighting progressed.

10. GEN Sir Archibald Wavell, Despatch on the Operations in the South-West Pacific (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948), pp. 19-22.

11. The Right Honorable John Curtin became Prime Minister of Australia on 7 October 1941. He never completely concurred with ABDACOM's formation, command arrangements, or conduct of the campaign. He blamed the United Kingdom for the lack of Australian participation within the ABDACOM staff. As the campaign for the NEI unfolded, Curtin increasingly criticized British decisions to reinforce Burma at the expense of Australia. See Wigmore, pp. 184, 255, and 286.

12. To assume the position as senior administrative officer, COL Lloyd was promptly promoted to Major General and reassigned from North Africa. Wavell considered him "a staff officer of great quality." See Wigmore, p. 206 and Wavell, p. 19.

13. Samuel Eliot Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific 1931-April 1942 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1948), p. 271 and Hart, p. 61.

14. Morison, Rising Sun, pp. 281-282; Wigmore, p. 256; and The Two-Ocean War, p. 73.

15. Wavell, p. 7. MacArthur was one of five land force commanders under Wavell. The other four included ter Poorten in Java, LTG T.J. Hutton (British Army) in Burma, LTG A.E. Percival (British Army) in Malaya, and MG D.V.J. Blake (Australian Army) in Darwin. See Wigmore, p. 206.

16. Matloff and Snell, p. 164; Wavell, p. 1; United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), The Campaigns of the Pacific War (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 34; Liddell Hart, p. 208; and Wigmore, pp. 259-260.

17. Liddell Hart, p. 208.

18. Liddell Hart, p. 209 (for the lower estimate of allied aircraft); Strategic Bombing Survey, pp. 29 and 35 (for the higher estimate); But Not in Shame, p. 224; Wigmore, pp. 40-41 and 90; and Hasluck, p. 351.

19. John B. Lundstrom, The First South Pacific Campaign: Pacific Fleet Strategy December 1941-June 1942 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1976), p. 198; Liddell Hart, pp. 208-209; and R. Ernest and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 1143.

20. ADM Sir Geoffrey Layton served as the CINC, China Station in 1940 and 1941. He assumed command of the British Far Eastern Fleet on 10 December 1941 upon the death of ADM Sir Tom Phillips who went down with the Prince of Wales.

VADM Conrad E.H. Helfrich served concurrently as the Commander, Dutch Naval Forces under ABDAFLOAT; CINC, Royal NEI Navy; and Minister of the Navy in the NEI. On 14 February 1942 he replaced Hart as Commander, ABDAFLOAT. Considered capable and aggressive, Helfrich's demanding military and political duties hindered his overall effectiveness. Wavell wrote that Helfrich acted "with skill and resolution." See Morison, Rising Sun, p. 311; But Not in Shame, p. 259; Wavell, p. 18; and Van Oosten, p. 69.

The ABDACOM Naval Force Command was referred to as ABDAFLOAT, the Army Force Command as ABDARM, and the Air Force Command as ABDAIR.

21. Hart, p. 53.

22. Wigmore, pp. 202 and 205.

23. Roosevelt, XI, p. 34.

24. Matloff and Snell, p. 124 and Wavell, pp. 19-22.

25. Wavell, pp. 4 and 19-22 and Matloff and Snell, p. 125.

Chapter 5

1. Wavell, p. 6; Esposito, II, p. 128; and Spector, p. 129.

2. Wigmore, pp. 256 and 286.

3. Morison, Rising Sun, pp. 296-297.

4. Doorman served as the commander of the ABDAFLOAT squadrons at the battles of Madoera Strait, Palembang, and Java Sea. Commissioned from the Royal Netherlands Naval College in 1910, Doorman saw extensive service in the NEI during his career and also served on the naval staff in The Hague. American writers tended to view him as incompetent, Dutch sources as a hero. See Van Oosten, p. 44.

5. Morison, Rising Sun, pp. 299-305 and Dupuy, pp. 1143-1144. Surabaya on the northeast coast of Java had been the principal port for Doorman's flotilla, but Japanese air attacks on the naval base beginning on 3 February forced the Allies to use the less capable base at Tjilatjap. ABDAFLOAT vessels proved incapable of countering Japanese attacks from the air.

6. Morison, Rising Sun, pp. 309-311 and Spector, p. 132.

7. Morison, Rising Sun, pp. 311-312. ADM Hart never sought the position of ABDAFLOAT Commander, and when he heard of his selection considered it an "emergency post" (Liddell Hart, p. 227). Hart believed that the Dutch attempted to have him removed from command from the beginning, and felt that he worked under a cloud. Noteworthy is his omission from the list of twelve senior ABDACOM leaders praised by Wavell in his Despatch. See Hart, Supplementary of Narrative.

8. Hart, p. 62. Wavell did not hesitate to overrule the commander on the ground when present. John Toland chronicled one such session on the 10th of February when Wavell reprimanded Percival at Singapore, ordered an unsuccessful counterattack, and told Australian MG H. Gordon Bennett to "get the hell out" and take his "bloody Aussies" with him (Toland, The Rising Sun, p. 340).

MG Bennett commanded the 8th Australian Division from 24 September 1940 through the surrender of Singapore on 15 February 1942. He had commanded a brigade in World War I and had been noted for bravery at Gallipoli. Bennett escaped from Singapore and a commission investigated his departure immediately following the debacle to determine if he had authority to leave his command and evade captivity. Exonerated, he commanded the Australian III Corps from 1942-1944. See Wigmore, pp. 32 and 650.

9. RADM Glassford assumed command of the United States Navy Forces (USNAVFOR), Southwest Pacific on 4 February 1942. The activation of USNAVFOR officially superseded the Asiatic Fleet. See Wigmore, pp. 416-417.

10. But Not in Shame, p. 223.

11. Morison, Rising Sun, p. 336 and Wigmore, p. 456.

12. But Not in Shame, p. 224.

13. Wigmore, pp. 458, 461, and 495. Churchill appointed Wavell the CINC, India immediately upon the dissolution of ABDACOM and Wavell arrived in India on 27 February. Wigmore considered Wavell a "great commander, perhaps the noblest whom the war discovered in the British armies."

Naval forces remaining in the NEI included eight

cruisers, eleven destroyers, and several submarines from all ABDA nations under VADM Helfrich. The NEI Army totalled 25,000 men in four regiments located throughout Java commanded by LTG ter Poorten. His only mobile reserves consisted of two Australian battalions, a British tank squadron, and the American 2nd Battalion, 131st Field Artillery, commanded by LTC Tharp.

14. Morison, Rising Sun, pp. 342-358 and Dupuy, p. 1144.

15. Morison, Rising Sun, pp. 375-377 and Dupuy, p. 1144.

16. G. Teitler, "An Outline of the Military History of the Dutch East Indies," in Je Maintiendrai: A Concise History of the Dutch Army, ed. H. Amersfoort and P.H. Kamphuis (The Hague: Historical Section of the Royal Netherlands Army, 1985), p. 147.

17. Morison, Rising Sun, p. 380; Van Oosten, p. 72; and Hart, pp. 73 and Supplementary of Narrative.

18. Wigmore, p. 675. LTG Sturdee assumed the post of Chief of the General Staff on 13 August 1940 after the death of Sir Brudenell White in an airplane crash. In World War I he had served as a Lieutenant Colonel on the staff of GEN Haig. See Wigmore, p. 32.

19. Strategic Bombing Survey, p. 29.

20. Hart, Supplementary of Narrative.

21. Hart, Supplementary of Narrative.

22. Strategic Bombing Survey, p. 29.

23. RADM Palliser had served as the Chief of Staff of the British Eastern Fleet immediately prior to the formation of ABDACOM. Wavell later wrote that Palliser's "cool judgment and knowledge were invaluable" (Wavell, p. 18). Hart considered him "fully loyal" (Hart, p. 58).

24. Hart, p. 58.

25. Hart, Supplementary of Narrative.

26. Morison, Rising Sun, p. 313 and Hart, Supplementary of Narrative. Summarizing the lack of air support for naval forces, Van Oosten wrote, "Co-operation and co-ordination at the highest level of command was lacking" (p. 71). Wavell later contended that land based aircraft were never available to protect ABDAFLOAT, and that had they been obtainable they would have been forced to fly only at night (Wavell, p. 9).

27. Morison, Rising Sun, p. 336 and remarks made at the School of Advanced Military Studies, 1 March 1990.

Chapter 6

1. JCS Test Pub 3-0, p. IV-14.

2. Carlo d'Este, Bitter Victory: The Battle for Sicily, 1943 (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1988), pp. 338-339.

3. Department of the Air Force, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, AFM 1-1, 1984, p. 2-8.

4. JCS Test Pub 3-0, pp. IV-2, IV-6, and IV-7.

5. JCS Test Pub 3-0, pp. IV-15 and IV-19.

6. JCS Test Pub 3-0, p. IV-9.

7. JCS Test Pub 3-0, p. IV-19 and remarks made by Carlo d'Este at the School of Advanced Military Studies on 15 February 1990.

8. JCS Test Pub 3-0, p. IV-2.

9. JCS Test Pub 3-0, p. IV-3.

10. JCS Test Pub 3-0, pp. IV-5 and IV-6; d'Este's remarks on 15 February 1990; US Army War College, "Factors Affecting Success in Coalition Command," Carlisle Barracks, 1986; and MAJ Jerry W. McElwee, "Principles for Organization of Joint and Combined Staffs," (SAMS Monograph, 1986), p. 15.

11. McElwee, p. 14.

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APPENDIX 1

PRINCIPAL TENETS OF JOINT AND COMBINED COMMAND

1. The commander should have the authority to direct actions necessary within his command to accomplish the mission. Examples of actions that a joint and combined commander should have the authority to direct include:

- a. organizing and employing commands and forces
- b. assigning tasks
- c. designating objectives
- d. providing direction over all aspects of military operations, joint and combined training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the assigned mission
- e. assigning subordinate commanders and primary staff officers
- f. specifying the chain of command.

2. The commander must ensure coordination among his subordinate commands to obtain unity of effort. A commander can ensure coordination among his subordinate commands by:

- a. providing centralized direction
- b. allowing decentralized execution
- c. insisting upon common doctrine
- d. making interoperability a priority which should lead to greater commonality in tactics, techniques, and procedures
- e. reviewing the supporting plans of his component commanders to ensure they support the accomplishment of his mission
- f. allowing no person or personality to act in any manner contrary to the necessary cooperative effort
- g. requiring the exchange of liaison officers, with the requisite communications, between forces
- h. establishing habitual relationships among forces of different countries that operate together
- i. demanding detailed planning, rehearsals, and wargaming between allied units
- j. requiring minimum essential information in tactical plans such as fire control measures
- k. cooperating early with allies to determine how each can best contribute to the accomplishment of the mission.

APPENDIX 2

CHRONOLOGY OF THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES

1931

September-Japan begins its aggression in Manchuria

1934

December-Japan abrogates the Washington Naval Treaty and henceforth recognizes no restrictions on the size of its navy

1936

25 November-Japan signs the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany

1937

7 July-Japanese attacks on the Chinese mainland begin

1939

3 February-Japan occupies Hainan Island

3 September-The United Kingdom (UK) and Australia declare war on Germany

1940

17 April-Secretary of State Cordell Hull declares any change in the status quo in the NEI would be harmful to peace in the region

10 May-Germany invades the Netherlands

27 June-Hull pressured by Australia's Casey and Britain's Lothian to commit the US Fleet in the defense of Singapore

21 July-Vichy agrees to allow Japan to occupy Indochina

11 August-Churchill strongly assures Australia of the British commitment to Australia's defense

22 September-Vichy grants the Japanese use of bases in Indochina and Japan begins occupation

12 October-First British effort at unified command among its armed services at high level with the formation of the Far East Command under Brooke-Popham

November-US Marine Regiment leaves Shanghai for the

Philippines

1941

January-ABC-1 meetings with British in Washington

March-Assistant Secretary of War Patterson adds the NEI to the list of nations receiving arms and equipment from the US

April-US, Britain, the Netherlands, Australia, and New Zealand meet at Singapore to plan for the defense of the Far East

1 May-composition of the United States Asiatic Fleet:

Heavy cruisers-1

Light cruisers-2

Destroyers-13

Submarines-28

June-Three battleships and one aircraft carrier transferred from the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic

JULY

24-Japanese troops begin the occupation of southern Indochina

26-MacArthur ordered to active duty as Commander, US Army Forces Far East (USAFPE)

AUGUST

21-FDR includes the NEI in Lend-Lease

23-report to MacArthur states that the NEI is critically short of small arms

12 October-LTG Hein ter Poorten becomes CINC of the Royal NEI Army after the death of LTG Berenschot in a plane crash

NOVEMBER

5-Japanese Imperial Headquarters (HQ) issues plan to attack Pearl Harbor, Malaya, the Philippines, and the NEI simultaneously if negotiations fail

30-British North Borneo reports sighting a Japanese fleet sailing south

DECEMBER

Naval strengths in the Pacific:

| <u>VESSEL</u> | <u>US</u> | <u>BR</u> | <u>NL</u> | <u>ALLIED TOTAL</u> | <u>JAPAN</u> |
|-------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|---------------------|--------------|
| Battleships | 9 | 2 | 0 | 11 | 10-11 |
| Aircraft carriers | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 10-11 |

| | | | | | |
|----------------|----|----|----|-----|---------|
| Heavy cruisers | 13 | 1 | 0 | 14 | 18 |
| Light cruisers | 11 | 7 | 3 | 21 | 17-23 |
| Destroyers | 80 | 13 | 7 | 100 | 111-129 |
| Submarines | 56 | 0 | 13 | 69 | 64-67 |

| | | | | | |
|------------------|-----|----|----|-----|---------|
| Total combatants | 172 | 23 | 23 | 218 | 230-259 |
|------------------|-----|----|----|-----|---------|

2-NEI Army Air Force fully mobilized

7-Pearl Harbor; American Pacific Fleet decimated and thereafter unable to intervene in the NEI

-Japanese air attacks on Manila, Singapore, and Hong Kong

-Marines repulse Japanese attempt to land on Midway

8-Japanese assault on Hong Kong

-Wavell orders Percival to withdraw to Johore in southern Malaya

9-Japan lands troops on Luzon

10-Prince of Wales and Repulse sunk off Malaya, same effect on the British Far Eastern Fleet as Pearl Harbor had on the US Pacific Fleet

12-Additional Japanese landings on south Luzon

13-NEI Navy sinks four Japanese troopships off Thailand; first Dutch combat in the Far East

16-Japan lands forces in Sarawak and on the northern coast of Borneo

17-Surface combatants of the Asiatic Fleet depart the Philippines, its twenty-nine submarines remain

22-ARCADIA Conference convenes in Washington, ends 14 January 1942

23-Japanese air raid on Rangoon, Burma

24-Japan secures Jolo in the Celebes Sea to support future operations against Dutch Borneo

27-LTG Sir Henry Pownall replaces Air Chief Marshall Sir Robert Brooke-Popham as British Commander-in-Chief Far East

31-Last submarine from the Asiatic Fleet leaves the Philippines

1942

JANUARY

1-ADM Hart arrives at Surabaya

5-Japanese Army begins the withdrawal of the 48th Division from the Philippines for use in Java

-Wavell flies from Delhi and arrives at Singapore on 7 January

7-Japan lands forces in northern Celebes and at Tarakan northeast of Borneo

10-Wavell arrives in Batavia and meets his staff

11-Amphibious and airborne assaults on Menado, in northern Celebes

13-Quezon complains to FDR that the promised military aid to the Philippines has not arrived

15-ABDACOM officially formed

16-Wavell informs Churchill of the bad state of affairs in Singapore

21-MG C.E.M. Lloyd assumes duties as the senior administrative officer, the highest ranking Australian on the ABDACOM staff

23-Battle of Macassar Strait, first surface action for US Navy since 1898

24-Landings at Balikpapan in southern Borneo

25-Wavell in Rangoon and again countermands orders given by the local commander

30-Japan begins assault on Ambon, the entire island including the important Amboina Naval Base captured by 3 February

31-British forces leave Malaya and occupy Singapore

FEBRUARY

4-ADM Glassford assumes command of the USNAVFOR Southwest Pacific; official end of the Asiatic Fleet

-Battle of Madoera Strait, American and Dutch flotilla attacked by Japanese aircraft

11-Japanese land on Bali, falls 19 February

13-Dutch RADM Doorman attempts to prevent Japanese landing at Palembang, Sumatra and is turned back by air attacks

15-Singapore capitulates; British lose 138,708 and the Japanese 9824 in the Malayan campaign

16-Allies attempt to reinforce Timor with one US field artillery battalion and an Australian infantry battalion. ordered back to Darwin by Wavell when he learned of the imminent Japanese attack on Timor

19-Battle of Lombok (or Bandoeng) Strait. Doorman attempts to intercept the Japanese Eastern Force sailing toward Java

20-Japanese begin conquest of Timor, completed by 24 February

-Wavell requests to withdraw British from ABDACOM and to abolish his headquarters, ordered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) not to withdraw forces from any nationality nor to surrender

22-Wavell sends message to Churchill stating that he had failed the Prime Minister and President Roosevelt

24-Brereton leaves the NEI for India with several B-17s and transport aircraft, LTG Brett already in Australia

25-Wavell leaves for Colombo, ABDACOM dissolved

27-Battle of Java Sea, seven Allied ships sunk effectively ending naval resistance in the NEI

28-Western Force lands at Batavia, and Japanese land forces at two other locations on Java

MARCH

1-ADM Helfrich dissolves ABDAFLOAT, remaining ships ordered to Australia

2-Dutch begin destruction of port at Surabaya

-VADM Helfrich flies to Ceylon leaving his family in the NEI

5-Bandung and Batavia captured

9-Dutch. GEN ter Poorten surrenders Java unconditionally. ending the campaign for the NEI

12-Senior British, Australian, and American officers sign the surrender document at Bandung

APPENDIX 3

ABDACOM COMMAND STRUCTURE

SUPREME COMMANDER-GEN SIR ARCHIBALD WAVELL, BRITISH ARMY

CHIEF OF STAFF-GEN SIR HENRY R. POWNALL, BRITISH ARMY

DEPUTY COMMANDER-LTG GEORGE H. BRETT, USAAF

COMMANDER NAVY FORCES-ADM THOMAS C. HART, USN

COMMANDER GROUND FORCES-LTG HEIN TER POORTEN, NEI ARMY

COMMANDER AIR FORCES-AIR CHIEF MARSHALL SIR RICHARD E.C. PIERSE, RAF

ALLIED NATIONAL COMMANDS

| | US | UK | NEI |
|------|-------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| NAVY | ADM HART | COMMODORE COLLINS | VADM HELFRICH |
| ARMY | MG BARNES | LTG PERCIVAL | LTG TER POORTEN |
| AIR | MG BRERETON | AIR CHIEF PIERSE | MG VAN OYEN |

GEN Pownall replaced Brooke-Popham as the British CINC. Far East on 27 December 1941. Before arriving in theater, Pownall served as the Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff in London. Wavell later stated that he owed "very much to his judgment and advice." See Wavell, p. 18.

LTG Brett, an Army Air Forces officer, served as the Commander of US Army Forces in Australia both before and after his tenure in ABDACOM. "Seriously over-loaded" with responsibilities within ABDACOM, he occupied the positions of Deputy Commander, Intendant General, and Commander Air Forces (the latter until Pierse arrived from Britain). Wavell later spoke of Brett's "tireless wise assistance and loyal cooperation." See Wavell, p. 18 and Hart, p. 55.

LTG ter Poorten served concurrently as the Commander Ground Forces and as the Commander, Dutch Army Forces under ABDACOM. His surrender of Java unconditionally on 9 March 1942 ended the campaign for the NEI. Wavell later commended his "calm determination." See Wavell, p. 18 and But Not in Shame, p. 261.

Air Chief Marshall Pierse served concurrently as the Commander Air Forces and as the Commander, British Air Forces under ABDACOM. Prior to November 1940 he was the Vice-Chief of the Air Staff in London. Wavell believed that Pierse got "as much as possible" from a hopelessly outnumbered air force. See Wavell, p. 18.

APPENDIX 4

ALLIED FORCES UNDER ABDACOM

United States

Air-nine air combat groups dedicated to the Southwest Pacific in December 1941, three dedicated to the defense of the NEI (consisting of one medium bomber and two pursuit groups). Total aircraft in the Philippines numbered 307 including thirty-five B-17s. Late in the NEI campaign the US sent 124 P-40s from Australia to Java; only thirty-six successfully made the journey.

Naval-Asiatic Fleet including two cruisers, thirteen destroyers, and twenty-nine submarines

Ground-130,000-141,000 Army personnel (including airmen) in the Philippines containing 21,000-31,000 Americans, elements of the 131st Field Artillery Regiment participated in the campaign for the NEI

United Kingdom

Air-158 modern aircraft in Malaya and thirty-seven fighters in Burma. Strategic Bombing Survey states that there were 332 British aircraft in Malaya, much higher figure than any other reference.

Naval-Eastern Fleet consisting of one battleship, one battle cruiser, one heavy cruiser, two light cruisers, and five destroyers

Ground-total of 134,000 in the theater of war initially with 80,000-88,000 in Malaya; 35,000 in Burma; and 11,000 in Hong Kong. Included in the 88,000 soldiers in Malaya are 19,000 British; 15,000 Australian; 37,000 Indian; and 17,000 Malays.

NEI

Air-between 144 and 200 aircraft, most of the bombers on Sumatra and fought in the Malayan campaign

Naval-three cruisers, 6-7 destroyers, and 13-18 submarines

Ground-NEI Army of 65,000-85,000 including 25,000 regulars. Organized into two divisions plus several native infantry or garrison infantry battalions.

Australia

Air-total of 165 operational aircraft in the Royal Australian Air Force in six squadrons (three in Malaya and one each at Ambon, Timor and Darwin)

Naval-two light cruisers

Ground-by late January 1942 there were 34,370 soldiers located in Malaya, Timor, Ambon, Java, and in northern Australia which was a part of ABDACOM

APPENDIX 5

IMPLICATIONS OF COMBINED COMMAND

1. Must be supported by a cohesive alliance whose countries possess similar interests and a desire to prevail
2. Should be established before war begins
3. Member nations must commit forward deployed forces, reinforcing forces, the resources necessary to sustain these forces, and commanders capable of commanding combined forces
4. The combined commander should report to one superior, not several different heads of state
5. The multinational commander's personality must enable him to understand and operate in the politico-strategic realities of the coalition
6. United States doctrine must more fully address the possibility of future combined commands wherein the commander is not an American
7. The formation of a combined command does not necessarily mean that the alliance agrees on a common strategy